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1. Introduction
A lot of research on terrorism has been done in the fields of sociology, political science and
history. With respect to economics and finance, terrorism has not received much attention from
researchers until recently. The effect of the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on stock markets
as well as that of more recent attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 has revealed that
terrorism risk is a new type of catastrophic risk that investors and financial institutions may be
facing. In this paper we intend to provide a deeper understanding of the impact of this risk on
the behavior of various financial markets. When studying the impact, we look at global, regional,
national and industrial market levels. In addition, we compare the impact of terrorist events on
financial markets with the impact of other extreme events such as financial crashes and natural
catastrophes.
Among existing research, this empirical paper is one of the very few (see for example Arin et al.
(2008), Chen and Siembs (2004), Eldor and Melnick (2004), Karolyi and Martell (2006)) that study
the link between terrorism and the behavior of stock markets. It is also the first one that analyzes
the impact on bond and commodity markets.
In contrast to impact studies which often employ only event-study methodology, in this work
we investigate the impact of terrorism using other methods as well. We use a non-parametric
methodology and a filtered GARCH with the Extreme Value Theory (EVT) approach. Both meth-
ods are standard econometric tools. However, our application of them in this work is original.
We show that a non-parametric approach is the most appropriate method among the three con-
sidered for analyzing the impact of terrorism on financial markets. In contrast to an event-study,
it does not impose strong parametric restrictions. It is also less computationally intensive than a
filtered GARCH-EVT method. Finally, a non-parametric approach allows us to analyze the im-
pact of events in the post-event period which is not possible with the GARCH-EVT approach. We
demonstrate the robustness of a non-parametric model when interest rates, equity market integra-
tion, spillover and contemporaneous effects are controlled.
The findings of our empirical investigation are useful for investors, insurance and re-insurance
businesses, banks and government agencies. This study is the first one to give insights into possible
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portfolio diversification strategies with respect to the risk of terrorism. We demonstrate how Swiss
and European investors can apply the results of our non-parametric model to the construction of
their investment portfolios.
In order to study the impact of terrorism on financial markets empirically, we look at the
effect of 77 terrorist attacks that occurred in 25 countries over an 11-year time period. We look
at global, European, American, and Swiss stock markets as well as insurance, banking, travel,
pharma/biotech, aero/defense and oil/gas industrial stock indices. In relation to other markets,
we look at the US, European and World bond indices as well as at the global commodity and gold
markets. When comparing the impact of terrorist events on these financial markets with the impact
of other extreme events, we analyze the impact of 4 financial crashes and 19 natural catastrophes
which occurred during the 11-year period under consideration.
The results of our work are as follows. Approximately two-thirds of the terrorist attacks con-
sidered lead to a significant negative impact on at least one stock market under consideration. The
Swiss stock market is affected by the highest number of attacks while the American stock market
by the lowest number. The insurance sector and the airline industry exhibit the highest suscepti-
bility to terrorism, while the banking industry is the least sensitive.1 This is in contrast to financial
crashes which have a strong negative impact on the banking sector. The analysis of the impact on
the aero/defense, pharma/biotech and oil/gas sectors shows both positive and negative reactions.
These sectors behave similarly to natural disasters and financial crashes.
As with terrorist events, natural catastrophes cause both positive and negative return move-
ments in the commodity/gold and bond markets. The gold index is affected by a lower number of
events compared to the commodity index, implying less sensitivity of the former to natural disas-
ters. Finally, among bond markets considered, the US government bond market shows the lowest
impact from terrorist attacks, natural catastrophes and financial crashes.
As to the strength of the impact, terrorist attacks and financial crashes cause event-day return
movements that are mostly extreme, with the strength of the impact declining in the post-event
period. This implies that although markets perceive these events as unusual, they do not see their
1Note that the banking sector was affected negatively by the 9/11 attacks. However, this event was exceptional in
terms of its magnitude and place of occurrence (Manhattan, the financial center).
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effects as long-lasting. Regarding natural catastrophes, the negative impact is more often observed
in the post-event period. This can be attributed to the fact that markets need more time to evaluate
the long-term impact of such events. Furthermore, as natural disasters can last for several days,
the impact is more likely to be evaluated during the period following the event.
The results of this paper suggest several diversification strategies for minimizing the terrorism
risk. Investors concerned about this risk should consider holding two groups of assets: those
which are likely to react positively to terrorist attacks, or those which have little or no negative
sensitivity to this risk. In the first case, a US Government bond index is the safest choice followed
by such industry stocks as aero/defense and pharma/biotech. However, given that these stock
markets may also exhibit a negative response, investing in these industries as a diversification
strategy against terrorist attacks may not always work. In the second case, a banking stock index
may be good for investment. It is important to note, however, that although a banking stock index
is least sensitive to terrorist attacks, it exhibits significant negative return movements associated
with financial crashes.
Regarding the other financial markets, investing in a composite commodity index is preferable
to investing in gold only. This is because the gold market often reacts more negatively than pos-
itively to terrorist events. In addition, when compared to the commodity market in general, the
negative impact on the gold market is more long-lasting. At the same time, the commodity market
also shows a short-term negative reaction to some terrorist events. This implies that investing in
gold and commodity markets may not always provide a good hedge.
Another possible way to reduce negative exposure to terrorist events would be to avoid invest-
ing in insurance, travel and airline stocks or to short these indices. Note that insurance and airline
industries show high negative sensitivity not only to terrorist attacks but also to financial crashes
and natural disasters. This implies that by taking long positions in these stocks, investors may end
up increasing their risk of loss if further terrorist attacks occur.
Finally, our analysis of the possible investment diversification strategies for Swiss and Euro-
pean investors shows that an investor who uses the results of our paper and constructs an invest-
ment portfolio in such a way that she imposes a negative correlation on the industries that react
inversely to the terrorist attacks and a positive average correlation on the rest of the covariance
4
matrix, would outperform other investors.
2. Related research
Analysis of existing literature on the impact of terrorism on financial markets shows that most
of the research has a descriptive character and focuses on the impact of very few terrorist events
(often only those which occurred on September 11, 2001). A recent article by Karolyi (2006)
discusses what is known and unknown about the effects of terrorist events on financial markets. It
also provides a summary of the research done in this area. According to the author, there is still
little known about the economic and financial consequences of terrorism.
A very recent paper by Arin et al. (2008) shows interesting results regarding the effect of ter-
rorist events on the markets’ behavior based on evidence from six different financial markets (In-
donesia, Israel, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and UK). In their work, the authors investigate the effects
of terrorism not only on the stock markets, but also on stock market volatility. They find that the
magnitude of terrorist effects is larger in emerging markets.
Johnston and Nedelescu (2005) examine cases in which financial markets are directly or indi-
rectly affected by terrorist acts. They review the reaction of the markets to the 9/11 attacks in the
US and the attacks in Madrid in March, 2004. The main conclusion of their study is that financial
markets are not only confronted with major disruptions caused by the massive damage to property
and communication systems, but also with high levels of uncertainty and market volatility, espe-
cially in the case of the 9/11 attacks in New York. However, there are some differences in the stock
market reaction to these two terrorist events. While the attacks in Madrid were perceived as mostly
having a regional effect, those in New York were seen as having repercussions on the global finan-
cial system.2 The authors view the timing of the attacks as a possible explanation for the different
impacts. Whereas the attacks in New York occurred during a period of economic downturn, the
2The major worldwide equity markets experienced sharp and rapid declines, demonstrating that market participants
perceived the 9/11 event as a global shock. In contrast, the 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid had much less effect on
the financial markets. The Dow Jones EURO STOXX fell by about 3% on March 11, and continued to drop during
the following days but had recovered almost completely by the end of the month. Similarly, after a small decline, the
S&P 500 returned to pre-March 11 levels in less than a month (Johnston and Nedelescu (2005)).
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attacks in Spain happened when the world economy was experiencing growth. We believe that the
difference in the impact can also be explained by examining the targets of the attacks. The 9/11
attacks happened in Manhattan, the financial center, while the bombings in Madrid were targeted
at a transport system.
Further evidence of the impact of terrorism on financial markets is offered by some impact
studies. Among existing literature, this paper is most closely related to that by Chen and Siembs
(2004) which examines the US capital market reaction to 7 terrorist and 7 military attacks over
the period 1915-2001, using an event-study approach. They apply their analysis to other capital
markets as well, but focus on the impact of only two events: the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. They find that after these two events, US capital markets rebound
and stabilize quicker than other markets, and that US markets are more resilient now than in the
past, which they attribute to the strength of the banking and financial sectors in the US. One of
the main conclusions of their paper is that financial markets are efficient in absorbing the shocks
caused by terrorist attacks and can continue to function in an effective way. Compared with the
work by Chen and Siembs (2004), this study covers a much wider range of terrorist events (77
versus 7) and applies not only the traditional event-study approach, but more rigorous economet-
ric techniques such as the non-parametric methodology and the filtered GARCH-Extreme Value
Theory approach.
Eldor and Melnick (2004) study how stock and foreign exchange markets react to terrorism in
Israel. The authors consider 639 terror attacks during the period from 1990 to 2003 and categorize
the data by location, target, type of attack and number of casualties. They show empirically that
terrorism has a permanent negative effect on stock markets but not on foreign currency markets.
They conclude that these markets are efficient in incorporating news about terrorist attacks, and
that there is no evidence that markets have become desensitized to terror over time.
Several studies consider the effects of the September 11 attacks exclusively on the stock mar-
ket. Carter and Simkins (2001) examine the impact of this event on airline stock returns. They
test whether market reaction on the first trading day after the attack is the same for each airline
or, alternatively, whether it distinguishes among airlines based on company characteristics. They
find that market differentiates among various airlines based on their ability to cover short-term
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obligations as measured by a ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets. According to their study,
airlines with low liquidity are penalized the most. No statistical significance is found for company
characteristics such as size, leverage and performance.
Other research focuses on the economic consequences and associated costs of terrorism. In
their paper, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) study the effects of terrorism on economic activity.
Karolyi and Martell (2006) analyze the long-term economic impact of terrorism. The authors
examine the impact of terrorist attacks on the stock price of targeted companies. They find that
the impact varies according to the domicile of the target company and the country in which the
attack occurs. They conclude that in countries which are wealthier and more democratic, attacks
are associated with greater share price reactions.
According to Raby (2003), airline, travel, tourism, accommodation, restaurant, postal and in-
surance industries are particularly susceptible to increased terrorism risks. Regions and economies
where these industries are concentrated are likely to suffer most from falls in output and employ-
ment.
3. Terrorism risk
From an economic and financial standpoint, terrorism has been described as having several
negative effects such as a reduction in the human and physical capital of a country, increased costs
of financial and other counter-terrorism regulations, vulnerability of critical infrastructure (power
plants, nuclear facilities, chemical factories, bridges, pipelines and water supply), increased fi-
nancial instability, destruction of market infrastructure and operations and a decrease in investor
confidence (see Johnston and Nedelescu (2005), Bonturi et al. (2002)). Because of enormous loss
potential, terrorism risk may put high financial demands on insurance and reinsurance businesses
and induce high insurance premiums. Today insurance companies mostly transfer this risk to
reinsurance businesses. When dealing with terrorism risk, the main challenge for both types of
financial institutions lies in its quantification. Even though some models have been proposed to
handle this problem, existing approaches are linked with catastrophe modeling.
In many ways, terrorism risk is similar to the risk of natural hazards such as floods, earth-
quakes, hurricanes and storms. In all these events, there is enormous loss potential and these
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events can affect entire economies. For example, the 9/11 attacks have evidenced that terrorism
is potentially a catastrophic risk. At the same time, there are several crucial differences between
terrorist attacks and the above-mentioned extreme events. Unlike terrorist attacks, catastrophes are
natural events that occur without intent and their conceivable place of occupance may be predicted
with less difficulty. Terrorist events are characterized by dynamic uncertainty in terms of their type
(suicide bombing, armed assault, kidnapping etc.), their target (military, personnel, government,
facilities etc.) and place and time of occurrence. Terrorists may respond to security measures by
shifting their attention to new targets or by changing the type of terrorist attack, the place or the
time of its occurrence. In other words, they behave strategically. In contrast, the actions that can
be taken to reduce the damage from possible natural disasters do not affect the probability and the
place of occurrence of these events.
The main challenge is to predict the likelihood and the financial consequences of terrorist at-
tacks and to quantify exposure to terrorism risk. In addition, when modeling this risk, analysts are
faced with a limited availability of historical data on terrorism losses. But even if these data were
easily accessible, it would not necessarily reflect the changing expectations of planned terrorist
activities today. In contrast, probabilities and consequences of natural hazards can be modeled
and quantified more easily using well-defined methods and historical data. Because of the above-
mentioned characteristics, it is much more difficult to manage terrorism risk than the risk of natural
hazards. This, in turn, calls for more studies on terrorism risk, and our work is the first that ana-
lyzes differences in the impact of terrorist attacks and natural disasters on the behavior of financial
markets.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Research questions
When implementing our empirical study, we address the following research questions:
• Research Question 1: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on global, European,
American and Swiss stock markets?
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• Research Question 2: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on such industry indices
as insurance, travel, airline, oil and gas, financial and banking?
• Research Question 3: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on such industry indices
as defense and pharmaceutical/biotechnology?
• Research Question 4: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on the commodity and
gold markets?
• Research Question 5: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on the bond market?
• Research Question 6: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on financial markets on
the event-day only, in the post-event window or both?
• Research Question 7: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on financial markets
which is similar to that of natural catastrophes and financial crashes?
4.2. Data
We use two types of data sets. The first data set includes daily prices of financial market indices
(see Table 1 for a list of indices). We obtain this data from DataStream and, for each index, we
consider available daily prices for the period from January 4, 1994 until September 16, 2005 (this
corresponds to 3054 data points).3 We compute the logarithmic daily percentage index returns
using the identity of:
Ri,t = LN(Pi,t/Pi,t−1), (1)
where Ri,t is the return on the index for period t, Pi,t is the price of the index at the end of period t,
and Pi,t−1 is the price of the index at the end of period t − 1.
The second data set includes information on terrorist events. We construct a database of ter-
rorist events using publicly available information on terrorism (mainly provided by the Terrorism
3For FTSE Global Banks and FTSE Global Financials, data are available from January 2, 1996; for MSCI Europe
Insurance and MSCI Europe Airlines, from January 2, 1995; for FTSE Eurozone Bond Index from May 4, 1998; and
for FTSE US Bond Index, from December 31, 1999. Regarding S&P 500 Index, data from September 12 to 19, 2001
were not available as the stock market was closed due to the 9/11 attacks.
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Research Center (TRA (2000)) and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO (2005))).
As limited availability of historical information on terrorist events is often considered to be a re-
striction to modeling terrorism risk, we consider the data collection implemented in this study to
be one of the first important steps in approaching the topic.
Data cover 77 terrorist events4 that occurred in 25 countries5 from January 1994 to August
2005. Though our list is subjectively determined, we select those terrorist attacks that are men-
tioned as significant in the aforementioned sources. Each terrorist event is characterized by the
date of attack, its type (armed assault, suicide bombing, bombing), the target, the place of occur-
rence and the number of people injured, killed or kidnapped.
When comparing the impact of terrorist attacks with the effect of other extreme events, we
consider 4 financial crashes and 19 natural catastrophes that happened during the 11-year period
considered. The financial crashes include the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, the 1997 mini-crash due
to the Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian financial crisis and the 2001 Argentina crisis. The
natural catastrophes include earthquakes, storms, floods, cyclones, typhoons, tornadoes, tsunami
and hurricanes.6
4.3. Methodology
In general, the event-study methodology is the most commonly used method to study the im-
pact of events (see Brown and Warner (1980), Chen and Siembs (2004), Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003)). This methodology, however, imposes restrictive requirements on the behavior of in-
dices’ returns. In this paper, we go beyond this traditional tool and implement two other ap-
4Table 1 of the Supplementary Appendix provides a list of terrorist events and it can be downloaded from
http://www.isb.uzh.ch/institut/staff/chesney.marc/publications/. Although the paper can be fol-
lowed without the Supplementary Appendix, it provides more information on the data sets, descriptive statistics and
some additional results of our study for interested readers.
5Argentina, Austria, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UK and the USA.
6 Table 4 of the Supplementary Appendix shows the 10 natural disasters (from the 19 events un-
der consideration) that were the most costly for the insurance industry from 1994 to 2005 (see
http://www.isb.uzh.ch/institut/staff/chesney.marc/publications/).
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proaches. These are the non-parametric conditional distribution estimation approach and the fil-
tered GARCH-EVT method. With the former, we gain the flexibility of having no assumptions
about the parametric form of the data. With the latter, we account for the volatility background,
possible dependence among returns and the fat tail nature of their distribution. Note that the
GARCH-EVT approach is quite computationally intensive and we are able to check the impact on
the event-day only.
4.3.1. The event-study approach
We use the event-study methodology to measure the magnitude of the effect of considered
extreme events on the behavior of stock, bond and commodity markets. To examine whether an
event has any impact on the market, we measure event-day abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) and test their statistical significance.7 As the event-study approach is a
well-known technique, we do not provide a more comprehensive overview of this methodology in
our work.
4.3.2. Non-parametric conditional distribution approach
Non-parametric estimation is a statistical method that allows a functional form of a fit to data
to be obtained without imposing any parametric assumptions. For example, a Kernel estimation of
an economic model y = M(x)+u, requires no specification of a regression function M(x) = E(y|x)
and the distribution of error terms. This way, non-parametric estimation lets the data speak for
itself and overcomes a disadvantage of parametric econometrics when inconsistency between data
and a particular parametric specification would result in non-robustness. At the same time, this
gain in flexibility of approach is not without costs, as non-parametric modeling has to deal with,
for example, a selection of a bandwidth and a type of Kernel function. We do not intend to give a
comprehensive overview of the fundamentals of non-parametric methodology. Rather, we want to
describe an application of this powerful tool to study the impact of terrorism on different financial
markets. We view this application, compared to event methodology, for example, as an alternative
7We apply a mean-adjusted return approach to compute ARs. CARs are computed over an interval of 6-days in
the post-event window.
11
way of studying the impact. Note that when we analyze an impact of some event by implementing
the event-study approach, we check the statistical significance of the effect of this event by means
of some test statistics. The latter, in turn, imposes some restrictions, since test statistics require
some distributional assumptions with respect to the abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal re-
turns (CARs) which have to be satisfied.
We apply a local polynomial regression (LPR) to time series data to get a non-parametric
conditional distribution of stock, bond and commodity index returns. We do not compute any test
statistics to check the significance of negative abnormal and/or extreme movements in the market
due to terrorism. Instead, for each index and terrorist event, we analyze the value of conditional
probability of a return - which is less than or equal to the one empirically observed on the day
of the event. The abnormality in the return corresponds to conditional probability in the interval
(0.05; 0.10]. Where this probability is 5% or less, we interpret the return as extreme. This is our
subjective approach to distinguishing between extreme and abnormal movements. We assume that
a terrorist attack has an impact on the index if it leads to negative abnormal and/or extreme event-
day returns. Since we are interested in knowing not only the immediate reaction of the market
to the event, but also the market response over some interval of time in a post-event window, we
estimate a non-parametric conditional distribution of non-overlapping 6-day CARs. We make our
inference about the impact of terrorist attacks in the aftermath of the event by looking at 6-day
CARs in a way similar to the one described for returns. Below we provide a description of the
non-parametric estimation implemented in this paper.
Let us consider a conditional distribution function π(z|x) ≡ P(Zi ≤ z|Xi = x). Since we work
in the time series context, Xi is a vector of lagged values of Zi that are returns on an index. If we
assume Yi = I(Zi ≤ z) then E(Yi | Xi = x) = π(z|x), consequently, the problem of estimation may
be viewed as regression of Yi on Xi.
Keeping this in mind and applying a local polynomial fitting to our time series data of index
returns Ri, we minimize the following expression:
n∑
i=1
(Yi − β0 − β1(Xi − x0))
2Kh(Xi − x0), (2)
where Yi = I(Ri ≤ rt) with rt standing for empirically observed (realization) return on the day of
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terrorist attack t, i = (1, . . . , n), n is a sample size and n=200; Xi = Ri−1, x0 = rt−1; h is a bandwidth;
Kh is a Kernel function.
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the idea of non-parametric estimation implemented
in this work. We take the 9/11 attacks as an example and build the conditional cumulative distribu-
tion function of returns on FTSE All World when conditioning is done on the return on September
10, 2001, a day before the 9/11 attacks. We find the conditional cumulative probability of the
return on FTSE All World, which is less than or equal to that on September 11, 2001 to be 0.037.
Since this value is less than 0.05, we conclude that this terrorist event has an extreme event-day
effect on this index.
We use a normal reference bandwidth selector (Fan and Yao (2003)), which defines an optimal
bandwidth hˆopt,n for the Epanechnikov kernel as 2.34σsn
−1/5, where σs is a standard deviation of a
sample. Implementation of this model leads to point estimates β̂0 and β̂1:
β̂ = (X′WX)−1X′WY, (3)
whereW is the diagonal matrix whose ith element is Kh(Xi−x0), and X is a design matrix with a first
column of ones. Obtained this way, a point estimate β̂0 corresponds to a conditional probability
of return on index, which is less than or equal to that empirically observed on the day of the event
(a terrorist attack) and when conditioning is done on the value of return on the previous day. The
same logic applies to a sample of 200 non-overlapping 6-day CARs. We compute the value of the
CAR on which conditioning is done as
CARt−1 =
j=−6∑
j=−1
AR j, (4)
where AR j is the abnormal return on an index at time j. We also implement a non-parametric
estimation when conditioning is implemented on the average of the returns R¯. We believe that this
approach improves the inference since the average return reflects normal market conditions better
than just one return on the day before the attack.
4.3.3. GARCH filter with an extreme value theory approach
When studying the impact of extreme events on financial market behavior, one can compare
the event-day return on the index with the value at risk (VaR) predicted for this day and computed
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for different levels of significance. In the case of terrorist attacks, if the return on the day of
a terrorist event is lower than the computed value of VAR, we may conclude that a considered
terrorist attack had an impact on the index. This method of studying the impact of events relates to
the tail estimation of financial time series and requires a well-chosen way to compute the VaR that
from a statistical point of view has a good predictive performance (a good fit model). In their recent
paper, Kuester et al. (2006) give an extensive and detailed overview and comparison of alternative
strategies to predict VaR. They implement their study using the NASDAQ Composite Index and
show that the hybrid method that combines a heavy-tailed generalized autoregressive conditionally
heteroscedastic (GARCH) filter with an extreme value theory (EVT) approach performs better than
other methods. More about the VaR measurement, using GARCH and EVT theory can be found
in the papers by Christoffersen et al. (2001), Longin (2005) and Bali et al. (2008).
The GARCH method works as follows. First, we apply a time-varying volatility model to the
time series of returns. We assume the following dynamics of returns:
Xt = µt + σtZt, (5)
where Xt is a strictly stationary time series representing daily observations of negative log returns
on index, and innovations Zt are white noise process and have a marginal distribution function
FZ(z). We assume the Gaussian distribution for innovations.
We assume that µt and σt are measurable with respect to ℑt−1, the information about the return
process available up to time t − 1. Similar to the paper by McNeil and Frey (2000), we use the
parsimonious but effective AR(1) model for the dynamics of the conditional mean:
µt = ϕXt−1 (6)
and GARCH(1,1) process for the conditional volatility:
σ2t = α0 + α1ǫ
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1, (7)
where α0 > 0, α1 > 0 and β > 0, ǫt = Xt − µt and α1 + β < 1.
For each terrorist attack, we take a sample from 200 to 2500 past return observations8 (starting
8We vary the sample size to get good backtesting results.
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one day before the attack) and fit this model to the data by means of the pseudo-maximum like-
lihood method to get the estimates of parameters θ̂ = (ϕ̂, α̂0, α̂1, β̂). Estimates of the conditional
mean series (̂µt−n+1, ..., µ̂t) and the conditional standard deviation series (σ̂t−n+1, ..., σ̂t) are obtained
recursively from (9) and (10) using reasonable starting values. When correctly specified and with
a good fit, this model allows us to obtain filtered residuals
(zt−n+1, ..., zt) =
( xt−n+1 − µ̂t−n+1
σ̂t−n+1
, ...,
xt − µ̂t
σ̂t
)
(8)
that are approximately iid, which is an important requirement for the EVT approach applied below.
Finally, the estimates of the conditional mean and variance for day t + 1 are given by µ̂t+1 = ϕ̂xt
and σ̂2
t+1
= α̂0 + α̂1̂ǫ
2
t + β̂σ̂
2
t , where ǫ̂t = xt − µ̂t.
We estimate the tail of the standardized residuals by means of the EVT, namely, by applying
the Peak-Over-Threshold methodology (POT). The latter approach focuses on the distribution of
excess returns over some threshold and applies a key result that the Generalized Pareto Distribution
(GPD) is the limit distribution of scaled excesses of iid random variables over high threshold. This
distribution has the following cdf for ξ , 0:
Hξ,β(y) = 1 −
[
1 +
ξy
β
]−1/ξ
, (9)
where β > 0, y ≥ 0 when ξ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ y ≤ −β/ξ and when ξ < 0. When ξ = 0, the expression
in (12) gets the form of Hξ,β(y) = 1 − exp
(
−y
β
)
. When implementing the EVT estimation, we first
order the residuals z(1), ..., z(n) and fit the distribution in (12) to the data (z(1) − z(k+1), ..., z(k) − z(k+1)),
the excess amounts over the threshold z(k+1) with k standing for the number of data in the tail. The
quantile estimate ẑq for q > 1 − k/n is
ẑq = z(k+1) +
β̂k
ξ̂k
((1 − q
k/n
)−ξ̂k
− 1
)
. (10)
Finally, we compute the estimate of the VaR. If we denote the marginal distribution of Xt as
FX(x) and let FXt+1+...+Xt+k |ℑt(x) be the predictive distribution of returns over the next k days, then the
quantile of the latter distribution is given by
VaRtq = x
t
q(k) = inf{x ∈ R : FXt+1+...+Xt+k |ℑt(x) ≥ q}. (11)
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Because FXt+1 |ℑ(x) = P{σt+1Zt+1 + µt+1 ≤ x | ℑt} = FZ((x − µt+1)/σt+1) we can compute VaR as
V̂aR
t
q = x̂
t
q = µ̂t+1 + σ̂t+1̂zq, (12)
where ẑq is the upper qth quantile of the marginal distribution of Zt obtained using (13). Computed
this way, the VaR accounts for the volatility background and fat-tail nature of the distribution of
index returns. These are two important stylized facts of most financial return series.
To evaluate the predictive power of the above approach, we implement a backtesting proce-
dure described in McNeil and Frey (2000). We update the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model parameters
for 500 moving windows and produce 500 one-step-ahead forecasts of V̂aR
t
q = x̂
t
q that are subse-
quently compared with observed values of returns xt+1 for q ∈ {0.90, 0.95, 0.99}. We implement
this procedure when studying the impact of every terrorist attack. A violation is said to occur when
xt+1 > x̂
t
q. Finally, given that the total number of violations is binomially distributed, we test the
hypothesis that the model estimates the conditional quantiles correctly.
4.4. Empirical results
4.4.1. Summary
Our empirical study provides the following answers to the research questions addressed in this
work (see Table 1 for a summary of the results):
• Research Question 1: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on global, European,
American and Swiss stock markets?
Yes they do. The results obtained show a significant negative impact of terrorist events
on the above mentioned markets: according to the event-study, 55 out of 77 terrorist attacks
(56 in the non-parametric case, 45 according to the GARCH-EVTmethod) have a significant
negative impact on the behavior of at least one of these markets. The Swiss market is affected
by the highest number of attacks while the American market is affected by the lowest number
of events. The reasons for a strong reaction by the Swiss market to terrorist events can relate
to several factors. This may be because the SMI index is comprised of fewer companies
than the S&P 500 (less broad index). In addition, the SMI’s sensitivity may be explained
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by the fact that this index includes stocks of companies that operate internationally and are
potentially more sensitive to extreme events due to the nature of their business. The results
obtained for the S&P 500 are quite reasonable given the fact that only 4 out of 77 terrorist
attacks we consider took place in the US. In addition, the resilience of the American market
to terrorist attacks can be explained by the stable banking/financial sector in the US at the
time of the events, which provided adequate liquidity to promote market stability.
• Research Question 2: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on such industry indices
as insurance, travel, airline, oil and gas, financial and banking?
Yes they do. The empirical evidence suggests a significant negative impact of terrorist events
on the above-mentioned industries. According to the event-study 61 terrorist attacks (55 in
the non-parametric case, 41 according to the GARCH-EVTmethod) lead to significant nega-
tive return movements in at least one industry index. Insurance and airline sectors exhibit the
highest susceptibility to these events (the MSCI Europe Insurance is affected by the highest
number of attacks), while the banking sector is least affected. These results are quite intu-
itive. Terrorist attacks often lead to fatalities and significant damage to property which ex-
plains a high sensitivity of the insurance sector to terrorist risk. The results support the con-
clusions of several studies (see Raby (2003), Bonturi et al. (2002), Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003), Enders et al. (1992)) that identify the airline, travel, tourism and insurance sectors
as those which are particularly sensitive to terrorist events. With respect to the lower level of
impact on the banking sector, it is possible that banks’ operations are not directly related to
the businesses that suffered from the terrorist events. Finally, the oil/gas industry shows both
significant negative and positive return response. We observe this effect at both global and
European levels. We observe a negative reaction of these indices more often than a positive,
and we can explain this reaction as a fear of possible economic slowdown and a decrease in
consumer confidence. This especially relates to the transportation sector, for example, by a
drop in air travel. In turn, this leads to a lower oil demand and a decrease in oil prices. At the
same time, a positive effect on oil prices is often related to the place of the attack (whether
it can cause a danger to oil production and transportation) and the oil market conditions at
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the time of the event (if an attack occurs when the market is tight because of increasing
global demand). Importantly, in this study we analyze the impact of terrorist events on re-
turns on the event-day and in the post-event window of 6 days after the attacks. Therefore,
conclusions drawn from our investigation relate to the markets’ short-term reaction only.
• Research Question 3: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on such industry indices
as defense and pharmaceutical/biotechnology?
Yes they do. The analysis of the impact shows both positive and negative reactions of these
indices across all methodologies. The pharma/biotech index is affected less often in a nega-
tive way compared to the defense index. The former index also shows a significant positive
response to more terrorist attacks. Among the events that negatively affect at least one of
these indices are the 2002 bombing in Peru, the 2003 suicide bombings in Israel and the
2004 bombings in Russia.
In terms of a positive response, we observe a significant positive impact on both sectors for
the 1996 suicide bombing in Israel and the 2002 bombings in Pakistan. We find a significant
positive impact on the pharma/biotech industry for the 2002 bombings in Indonesia/Bali
and the 2005 armed assault in Colombia. We identify a significant positive impact on the
defense industry for the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City. Finally, when we examine the
post-event impact over a longer time window (11-day CARs and 30-day CARs), we find
a significant positive response of both indices to such terrorist attacks as that of 9/11, the
bombings in Madrid and Egypt in 2004 and in London in 2005. One of the explanations
of the positive impact on the defense and pharma/biotec indices that we may suggest is
that terrorist events may induce an increase in government expenditures on defense and
on research in the pharma/biotech area in relation to preventive actions against possible
chemical or biological terrorist attacks.9
• Research Question 4: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on the commodity and
9The OECD report also suggests the possibility of a positive reaction by the defense industry to terrorist events
(Bonturi et al. (2002)).
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gold markets?
Yes they do. The analysis of the impact shows both significant positive and negative reac-
tions of the commodity and gold market returns to terrorist events. The latter market shows
more negative sensitivity to terrorist events compared to the commodity and bond markets.
Given that gold is usually considered to be a ‘safe-haven’ asset, these empirical results re-
main difficult to explain. Commodity and gold markets respond positively to some terrorist
events (the 9/11 attacks) and show no significant reaction to others (the bombings in Egypt
in 2004). Finally, some events, the 2005 bombings in London for example, cause significant
negative return movements in the commodity index and have no effect on the gold index.
Such behavior implies that investing in the commodity/gold markets as a hedging strategy
against terrorism risk may not always work because, with terrorist events, these markets can
react negatively.
• Research Question 5: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on the bond market?
Yes they do. The analysis of the impact shows both significant positive and negative re-
actions of the bond market returns to terrorist events. We observe the negative impact of
some attacks mostly on the event-day only. Compared to other bond indices, the Global
Government Bond Index experiences significant positive return movements more often than
negative return movements. The FTSE US Government Bond Index displays the lowest
level of impact, both positive and negative. As with commodities and gold, investing in
bonds can be a possible hedging strategy against terrorism risk. However, one should be
aware of the possibility of a significant negative response of these assets’ returns to terrorist
attacks.
• Research Question 6: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on financial markets on
the event-day only, in the post-event window or both?
The empirical results show that terrorist events lead to a significant response in financial
market returns in all the above-mentioned cases. In most cases, the event-day stock return
movements associated with attacks are extreme and the strength of the impact declines in
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the post-event period.
Regarding commodity markets, significant return movements in the gold index, both nega-
tive and positive, are extreme and often observed in the post-event period. In contrast, we
find a negative reaction by the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index in all periods, and we
observe a positive response mostly on the event-day.
Among bond indices, the global and European bond markets react negatively in all periods,
while return movements are more often extreme than abnormal. Unlike these two markets,
the US bond market responds positively to terrorist events mostly on the event-day and
associated returns have an abnormal character.
All financial markets perceive terrorist attacks as unusual events. While some of them see
the effects of these events as occurring mostly on the event-day only (the US bond market),
some markets take a longer time to evaluate the impact and reveal their reaction mostly in
the post-event period (the gold market). Finally, some markets (stocks, commodities, global
and European bonds) react to terrorism either on the event-day or in the post-event window
or both.
• Research Question 7: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on financial markets
which is similar to that of natural catastrophes and financial crashes?
There are both similarities and differences between the impact of terrorist events on financial
markets and the effect of financial crashes10 and natural disasters.
While the European and Swiss markets show high susceptibility to terrorist attacks and
natural catastrophes, their response to financial crashes is less negative. At the industry
level, the insurance and airline sectors show a negative sensitivity to all types of the extreme
events. Financial crashes demonstrate a strong negative impact on the banking and financial
sectors. This is in contrast to the effect of terrorist attacks and natural catastrophes that do
10 A recent paper by Wang et al. (2009) applies the event-study methodology and multivariate regression analysis
to study how a stock market crash affects individual stocks and if stocks with different financial characteristics are
affected differently.
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not cause a strong negative response in the sectors mentioned above. Similar to terrorist
events, we observe both a positive and a negative impact of natural disasters and financial
crashes on such industries as oil/gas and pharma/biotech.
The event-day negative returns associated with financial crashes and terrorist events are
extreme. The sensitivity of stock markets to these events declines in the post-event window.
In contrast, natural disasters are associated with extreme return movements more in the days
following the events. This result may be because markets need more time to evaluate the
long-term consequences of natural disasters on returns compared to the two other types of
events.
Both terrorist events and natural disasters cause positive and negative return movements
in the commodity/gold and bond markets. Among the latter markets, the US bond market
shows the least impact from all extreme events considered. With respect to the impact of
financial crashes, our empirical findings confirm a traditional perception of the commod-
ity and bond markets as those providing ‘safe-haven’ investment opportunities in times of
crises. This is because these markets react positively to financial crashes.
4.4.2. Empirical results across different methodologies
4.4.2.1. The event-study approach
Analysis of the response of four stock indices - FTSE All World, MSCI Europe, S&P 500
and SMI to terrorist attacks shows that 22 out of 77 attacks have no impact on any of these stock
markets.11 Among these events are not only local attacks that are characterized by very little or
no damage to property and people as for example, the bombing in Israel on May 27, 2001, but
also such events as the attacks in Argentina on July 18, 1994 that are considered to be one of the
worst in terms of fatalities. The bombings in Sri Lanka/Colombo on July 24, 2001 are among the
worst in terms of insured property loss during the period 1970-2001. In other words, the impact of
attacks on stock markets is not necessarily in direct relation to their magnitude in terms of insured
losses and fatalities.
11Tables 5-8 and 13-16 in the Supplementary Appendix show detailed results of an event-study (see
http://www.isb.uzh.ch/institut/staff/chesney.marc/publications/).
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Our investigation shows that 55 out of 77 terrorist events have a significant negative impact on
at least one stock index. FTSE All World and Swiss indices are affected by the highest number of
events while the S&P 500 Index is affected by the least number of attacks. The 9/11 attacks as well
as the suicide bombing in Israel on June 19, 2002 and bombings in Madrid 2004, in Egypt 2004
and in the UK 2005 are good examples of events that have a negative impact on stock markets at
both global and local levels (see Table 2). We find that the 9/11 terrorist attacks have a significant
negative effect on global, European, American and Swiss stock markets both on the event-day and
in the post-event window. The S&P 500 shows the strongest negative reaction in the post-event
window compared to other indices, which reflects a prolonged negative effect of the 9/11 event on
the American market. As to the negative impact of this event on the European market, our results
find support in the empirical paper by Chen and Siembs (2004), where the authors conclude that
European capital markets experience significant negative 6-day CARs due to the 9/11 attacks.
The empirical results for various industry indices show that 62 out of 77 terrorist events have
a significant negative effect on at least one of them. The insurance sector is affected by the highest
number of events while the banking and oil/gas industries are affected by the lowest number of
attacks. Within the insurance sector, MSCI Europe Insurance experiences the most negative impact
and is closely followed by FTSE All World Non-Life Insurance. These results are quite intuitive
since terrorist attacks often lead to fatalities and significant damage to property that explains a high
sensitivity of the insurance sector to terrorism risk. Unlike the insurance industry, the banking
sector is affected by the least number of attacks. It is possible that banking operations are not
directly related to the businesses that suffered from the terrorist events.
We find evidence of the significant negative impact of terrorist attacks on the FTSE All World
Travel and MSCI Europe Airlines. For both, almost half of the attacks considered lead to a signif-
icant negative reaction. While the FTSE All World Travel is affected more often in the post-event
period, we observe this type of impact for MSCI Europe Airlines less frequently. In addition,
when characterizing the impact on the airline index, we see that more than half of the terror-
ist events (out of 31 that have an impact) cause significant negative return movements on the
event-day and in the post-event window, reflecting a high susceptibility of this sector to terror-
ism risk. These results support conclusions of several studies (see Raby (2003), Bonturi et al.
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(2002), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Enders et al. (1992)) that identify airline, travel, tourism
and insurance sectors as those that are particularly sensitive to terrorist events.
Analysis of the ARs and 6-day CARs shows evidence of significant negative as well as positive
impact of terrorist attacks on the aero/defense and pharma/biotech industries. The pharma/biotech
index is affected less often in a negative way compared to the aero/defense index. It also shows a
significant positive response to more terrorist attacks.
The aero/defense and pharma/biotech sectors are not the only industries that experienced both
a positive and a negative impact of terrorist attacks. An analysis of the reaction of the oil/gas sector
also reveals these two types of impact that is observed at both global and European levels. Some
terrorist events first cause a significant negative event-day response in the oil/gas industry and then
lead to a significant positive impact in the post-event period. This behavior is observed, for ex-
ample, for the 2004 bombings in Madrid (FTSE Europe Oil/Gas). In this case, we may possibly
explain the immediate negative reaction of the market by the fact that these bombings are targeted
at the transportation system. As new information is processed with respect to the long-term effect,
the market reveals no fear.
4.4.2.2. The non-parametric approach
We obtain the results in relation to the event-day impact of attacks when conditioning is im-
plemented on the average return.12 Similar to the findings of the event-study approach, the impact
of attacks on the stock markets is not necessarily in direct relation to their magnitude in terms of
insured losses and fatalities. Our investigation shows that 56 out of 77 terrorist events have an
impact on at least one stock market under consideration.13 The Swiss and European indices are
12There are several reasons for this. First, as we mentioned before, the return on the day before the attack might
not represent normal market conditions as accurately as the average return. Secondly, analysis of the data shows
that there are quite a few terrorist attacks that have low event-day impact when conditioning is implemented on the
previous return, no impact in the post-event window and no event-day impact when conditioning is performed on
average returns. In addition, these attacks are such that their magnitude or place of occurrence suggest that no impact
on the given stock index is a reasonable result.
13Tables 7-10 and 17-20 in the Supplementary Appendix show detailed results of a non-parametric approach (see
http://www.isb.uzh.ch/institut/staff/chesney.marc/publications/).
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affected by the highest number of events, while the S&P 500 Index is affected by the least number
of attacks. These results are similar to those revealed in the event-study.
For FTSE All World, MSCI Europe, S&P 500 and SMI, terrorist attacks more often lead to
an event-day negative response and less often to a prolonged negative reaction. Similar to the
results of the event-study approach, all stock indices experience extreme event-day negative return
movements more often than abnormal return movements. The strength of the impact declines in
the post-event period. This result also applies to the industry indices with the exception of airline,
aero/defense and pharma/biotech sectors. Similar to the findings of the event-study approach, the
negative impact of terrorist events is found at both global and local levels (see Table 3).
We find that 55 terrorist attacks have significant negative impact on at least one industry in-
dex. This result reflects the more conservative nature of the non-parametric approach compared to
the event-study methodology. The latter suggests that a larger number of events cause a negative
market response. This result can be due to restrictive assumptions imposed by test statistics used
in the event studies. At the same time, the findings across different industries are quite similar
among these methodologies. The insurance and airline sectors show high sensitivity to terrorism,
while the FTSE Europe Oil/Gas, followed by the banking sector is affected by the lowest number
of attacks. Similar to the findings of the event-study approach, the aero/defense, pharma/biotech
and oil/gas sectors exhibit both positive and negative abnormal return movements associated with
terrorist events. Events that cause positive reaction are similar to those identified in the event-study
(see Tables 6-7).
4.4.2.3. The GARCH filter with EVT approach
In contrast to the other two approaches, the results provided by this method describe only the
event-day impact of terrorist attacks.14 45 out of 77 terrorist events have a significant negative
impact on at least one stock index.15 More than half of these events cause extreme rather than
abnormal event-day returns. The Swiss stock index is most often affected. These results are
14See section 4.5 that explains the limitations of the GARCH-EVT method.
15Tables 11-12 in the Supplementary Appendix show detailed results of a GARCH-EVT method (see
http://www.isb.uzh.ch/institut/staff/chesney.marc/publications/).
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similar to those revealed in the event-study and in the non-parametric approach. At the same time,
American and European markets exhibit the lowest level of event-day impact.
At the industry level, 41 out of 77 attacks lead to significant negative event-day return move-
ments in at least one industry index. Similar to the findings of the other two methods, the insurance
and airline industries exhibit the highest susceptibility to terrorism (the MSCI Europe Insurance
is affected by the highest number of attacks). The oil and pharma/biotech sectors exhibit the least
negative event-day impact. The GARCH-EVT method suggests a greater negative impact on the
aero/defense index and a lesser negative impact on the pharma/biotech index compared to the other
two methods. At the same time, it also displays the presence of significant positive event-day re-
turn movements in these two sectors, a result which is similar to the findings of the other two
methods.
We identify some terrorist events, namely the 1996 bombing in Sri-Lanka/Colombo, the Febru-
ary 1997 armed assault in the US and the February 1997 kidnapping in Indonesia as those causing
a significant positive impact on the pharma/biotech sector. Other methods, however, do not iden-
tify the impact of these events. With the exception of the above-mentioned events, the list of
attacks that lead to the positive event-day impact is similar across all methodologies (see Tables
6-7). Finally, concerning the oil/gas sector, the GARCH-EVT approach shows a significant nega-
tive event-day impact of a smaller number of attacks and a significant positive impact of a greater
number of attacks compared to the other two methods.
4.5. Which method to use?
Tables 1-4-5-6-7 summarize the findings of our empirical work across different methodologies.
Comparing methodologies, the GARCH-EVT approach shows the least number of extreme events
that lead to significant negative event-day return movements in the indices considered. Regarding
positive impact, the event-study approach often reveals a significant effect of a lower number of
events. For indices that experience both types of impact, the GARCH-EVT method shows more
positive impact compared to other methodologies. The differences in impact across methodologies
can relate to the underlying assumptions they impose on the market returns. The GARCH-EVT
approach, for example, accounts for the volatility background, dependence and the fat-tail nature
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of the market returns. These are important characteristics of financial market returns that are not
captured by the other two methodologies. However, the GARCH-EVT approach allows us to study
the event-day effect only and is computationally intensive. These features are the significant draw-
backs of the GARCH-EVT approach, and we believe, therefore, this approach is inferior to the
other two methods. The event-study approach, on the other hand, is too simplistic since it imposes
strong parametric assumptions which may not hold in reality. In contrast, for a non-parametric
approach those parametric restrictions do not apply and it allows us to analyze post-event effects.
Moreover, this approach requires less computational work than GARCH-EVT. Non-parametric
estimation lets the data speak for itself and overcomes a disadvantage of parametric econometrics
when inconsistency between data and a particular parametric specification would result in non-
robustness. Therefore, we consider a non-parametric approach to be the most appropriate method
among the three for analyzing the impact of terrorism on financial markets. In the following sec-
tions we show the robustness of this method and analyze how the results of this approach can be
used for investors’ portfolio diversification strategies against terrorism risk.
4.6. An application: Portfolio diversification strategies
In this section we analyze how Swiss and European investors can use the results of the non-
parametric approach in their portfolio diversification strategies. We focus on Swiss and European
investors because sectoral indices which are going to be used for hedging purposes against ter-
rorism risk are mainly dominated by US stocks. Therefore, the impact of the hedging strategies
on portfolio performance will be more pronounced for Swiss and European investors than for US
investors due to the high correlation between hedging indices and the S&P 500 index.
First, we consider three Swiss investors who construct equity-only efficient portfolios one week
before the September 11 terrorist attacks. Then we check the performance of these portfolios on
the event-day, i.e. September 11, 2001, as well as one, two and three weeks after the attacks. The
first investor holds only the Swiss market portfolio (i.e. the SMI). The second and third investors
use the results of our non-parametric approach. In addition to the SMI, they include in their portfo-
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lios sectoral indices that react negatively16 and positively17to terrorist attacks. The only difference
between the portfolios of the last two investors comes from the structure of the covariance ma-
trices of returns. The second investor applies an average-correlation technique (see Elton et al.
(1978)) to estimate the covariance matrix of the asset returns based on historical data. She esti-
mates the variances and a single average correlation of the returns and then constructs a covariance
matrix with these values. To some extent, this investor constructs an international portfolio that
includes indices affected by terrorist attacks. However, she doesn’t take into consideration a pos-
sible direction of the impact of terrorist events (positive or negative). In contrast, the third investor
incorporates a possible direction of the impact of these events. She calibrates a negative corre-
lation to the sectoral indices which react inversely to the terrorist attacks and a positive average
correlation to the rest of the covariance matrix.
The estimation of a covariance matrix of the returns explained above is quite simplistic. How-
ever, the results of DeMiguel et al. (2009) show that an investor could be better off ignoring data
on asset returns and using the naive portfolio weights of 1/N. The authors claim that “there are
still many miles to go before the gains promised by optimal portfolio choice can actually be real-
ized out of sample.” As it is not the main focus of this study, we leave it to other researchers to
develop better estimation schemes.
The out-of-sample performances of the portfolios considered in our analysis are presented in
Table 8 via portfolio Sharpe Ratios.18 On the event-day (i.e. September 11, 2009) all portfolios
perform poorly, but the relative performance of the second investor is better than that of the first
one, and the relative performance of the third investor is better than that of the second investor.19
When the performance horizon increases, we see a similar pattern where the third investor outper-
16Insurance, airline and travel indices.
17Aero/defense and pharma/biotech indices.
18A recent paper by Zakamouline and Koekebakker (2009) presents how generalised Sharpe Ratios can be used in
the portfolio performance evaluation. See also Farinelli et al. (2008) and Jha et al. (2009) for other measures than the
Sharpe Ratio in order to analyze portfolio performances.
19Although negative Sharpe Ratios could be misleading, it is not the case in our study. This is because during the
performance evaluation period the standard deviation of the first portfolio is larger than that of the second, and the
standard deviation of the second portfolio is larger than that of the third.
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forms the other two.
We follow the same steps when performing our analysis for European investors. We construct
three different portfolios one week before the September 11 terrorist attacks and then evaluate
their performance on the event-day as well as one, two and three weeks after the attacks. The
first investor holds only the European market portfolio (i.e. the MSCI Europe index). The second
investor holds the MSCI Europe index and incorporates the results of our study by investing in the
indices that are affected by terrorist attacks. However, she does not account for the direction of the
impact of these events. Finally, the third investor holds the MSCI Europe index and indices which
are sensitive to terrorist attacks. In contrast to the second investor, she calibrates the covariance
matrix in such a way that she imposes a negative correlation on the industries that react inversely
to the terrorist attacks and a positive average correlation on the rest of the covariance matrix.
The out-of-sample performances of these portfolios are presented in Table 9. Similar to the
results for the portfolios of Swiss investors, all portfolios of European investors perform poorly
on the event-day. In relative terms, however, the third investor outperforms the second investor
and the second investor outperforms the first investor20 on the event-day and on the other days of
analysis.
The overall results across portfolio diversification strategies of Swiss and European investors
described above show that portfolios which account for a possible impact of terrorist events
demonstrate better performance than those which ignore it. Moreover, the hedged portfolios of
the Swiss investors outperform those of European investors, as the impact of the 9/11 attacks were
worse for the Swiss market than for European markets (see Table 3). The findings of our study are
useful as they reveal not only the indices which may be affected by terrorist events, but also the di-
rection of the impact (positive or negative). In other words, an investor who uses the results of our
paper and constructs an investment portfolio in such a way that she imposes a negative correlation
on the industries that react inversely to terrorist attacks and a positive average correlation on the
rest of the covariance matrix, would outperform other investors who don’t consider these inverse
20Negativity of the Sharpe Ratios does not lead to a wrong conclusion in this case either. This is because during a
performance evaluation period, the standard deviation of the first portfolio is larger than that of the second, and the
standard deviation of the second portfolio is larger than that of the third.
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reactions.
4.7. Robustness of the non-parametric methodology
In order to show the robustness of the non-parametric approach, we continue our analysis with
the SMI and MSCI Europe index returns and implement controls for interest rates, equity market
integration, lagged spillovers and contemporaneous effects.21 To do so, we run the following
regressions
(RS MIt+1 −R f
Swiss
t+1 ) = α+β1(R
FTS E,World
t+1
−R fWorldt+1 )+β2(R
S MI
t −R f
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t )+β3(R
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t+1 )+ǫ, (13)
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(14)
where Rt+1 stands for the log-return on a day t + 1 and R f is a risk-free rate. In other words, we
regress excess index returns on a constant, excess world equity index returns, lagged excess index
returns and excess S&P 500 index returns which control for equity market integration, lagged
spillovers and contemporaneous effects respectively.
Our aim is to compare the findings of a non-parametric approach when applied to the residuals
of this regression analysis with the results that are obtained before the controls for different effects
are introduced. Tables 10-11 show that the results are quite similar for the robustified and the un-
robustified index returns. That is, for the SMI, 7 out of 10 events have an event-day impact using
both robustified and unrobustified methods. For the MSCI Europe index, the event-day results are
similar for 8 out of 10 events. In terms of the post-event window effects, 5 out of 6 events demon-
strate similar results for both indices. Therefore we conclude that for the data under consideration,
our non-parametric methodology is robust with respect to interest rates, equity market integration,
spillover and contemporaneous effects.
5. Conclusions
This study shows the results regarding the global, regional, national and industrial effects of
terrorist events on stock markets as well as the impact of attacks on commodities and bonds. Fur-
21Note that due to data restrictions we are able to perform the robustness checks from the beginning of 2000 until
the end of 2005.
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thermore, it compares the impact of terrorist events on financial markets with the effect of natural
catastrophes and financial crashes. To do so, we present three different methodologies namely,
event-study, non-parametric and filtered GARCH-EVT approaches. The results of our analysis
show that a non-parametric approach is the most appropriate method among the three for ana-
lyzing the impact of terrorism on financial markets. It allows us to study both event-day and
post-event window effects, it does not impose strong parametric restrictions, and it is not com-
putationally intensive. We demonstrate the robustness of this method when interest rates, equity
market integration, spillover and contemporaneous effects are controlled. Finally, we show how
the results of this approach can be used for investors’ portfolio diversification strategies against
terrorism risk.
Approximately two-thirds of the terrorist attacks considered lead to significant negative impact
on at least one stock market under consideration. The Swiss stock market is affected by the highest
number of attacks, the American stock market by the lowest. The airline industry and insurance
sector exhibit the highest susceptibility to terrorism, while the banking industry is the least sen-
sitive. This is in contrast to financial crashes which demonstrate a strong negative impact on the
banking sector. The analysis of the impact on the aero/defense, pharma/biotech and oil/gas sectors
shows both a positive and a negative reaction. These indices behave similarly in case of the natural
disasters and financial crashes.
The results of our study suggest several diversification strategies against terrorism risk. If
concerned about this risk, investors should hold assets that can react positively to terrorist attacks
or, alternatively, assets that have little or no negative sensitivity to this risk. In the first case, the US
Government bond index is the safest choice followed by such industry stocks as aero/defense and
pharma/biotech. However, given that these indices can also exhibit a negative response, investing
in these industries as a diversification strategy against terrorist attacks may not always work. In the
second case, a banking stock index can be a good investment. Note that, though this stock index is
less sensitive to terrorist attacks, it exhibits significant negative return movements associated with
financial crashes.
Regarding the other financial markets, investing in commodities is preferable to investing in
gold as the gold market reacts more often negatively than positively. In addition, compared to the
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commodity market in general, the negative impact on the gold market is more long-lasting. At
the same time, the commodity market also shows a short-term negative reaction to some terrorist
events. This implies that investing in the gold and commodity markets may not always provide a
good hedge.
A possible way to reduce negative exposure to terrorist events would be to avoid investing in
the insurance, travel and airline stock markets or to short these indices. Note that the insurance and
airline industries shows high negative sensitivity not only to terrorist attacks but also to financial
crashes and natural disasters. This implies that by taking long positions in these stocks, investors
may end up increasing the risk of losses in these cases where extreme events occur.
There are both similarities and differences between the impact of terrorist events on financial
markets and the effect of other extreme events. For example, the insurance and airline industries
show high sensitivity to all three categories of extreme events. The banking industry shows little
negative impact of natural hazards, which is similar to the impact of terrorist attacks and in contrast
to the effect of financial crashes. Terrorist attacks and natural disasters cause both positive and
negative significant return movements in the commodity and bond markets. In contrast, financial
crashes have a positive effect on these markets. Terrorist attacks and financial crashes cause an
event-day return movement that has an extreme nature in general, with the strength of the impact
declining in the post-event period. As for natural catastrophes, the negative impact is more often
observed in the post-event period, implying that markets need more time to evaluate the long-term
effect of these extreme events.
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Figure 1: FTSE All World index: 9/11 attacks. A non-parametric conditional cumulative distribution function of
returns on FTSE All World that we obtain based on 200 observations when conditioning is done on the return on 10th
of September 2001, a day before the 9/11 attacks. The dotted line corresponds to an empirical unconditional cdf,
dashed lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1: Impact of terrorist attacks, financial crashes and natural disasters on financial markets
Terrorist Attacks Financial Crashes Natural Disasters
Impact Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive
FTSE All World ∨ ∨ ∨
MSCI Europe ∨ ∨ ∨
S&P 500 ∨ ∨ ∨
SMI ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE Global Banks ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE Global Financials ∨ ∨ ∨
MSCI Europe Insurance ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Life Insurance ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Non-Life Insurance ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Travel ∨ ∨ ∨
MSCI Europe Airlines ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Aero/Defense ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Pharma/Biotech ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE All World Oil/Gas ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
GSCI Commodity ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
GSCI Gold ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
J.P.Morgan GGBI ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE Eurozone Bond Index ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
FTSE US Government Bond Index ∨ ∨ ∨
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Table 2: An event-study approach: Global and local effects. The table displays the effect of five major terrorist events on stock markets. It shows the strength
of the impact of these extreme events. AR stands for the abnormal return and CAR for cumulative abnormal return. The number of stars next to AR and CAR
indicates their statistical significance level: one star corresponds to 0.10, two stars to 0.05 and three stars to 0.01.
N Event Terrorist Attack FTSE All World MSCI Europe S&P 500 SMI
Day Event-Day 6-day Event-Day 6-day Event-Day 6-day Event-Day 6-day
AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR
1 11.09.2001 9/11 Attacks in −0.0238∗∗∗ −0.0441∗∗ −0.0628∗∗∗ −0.0540∗∗ −0.0484∗∗∗ −0.0668∗∗∗ −0.0729∗∗∗ −0.0536∗∗
the US (-3.06) (-2.23) (-6.84) (-2.32) (-5.09) (-2.77) (-6.65) (-1.92)
2 11.03.2004 Bombing in Madrid −0.0174∗∗∗ −0.0185∗ −0.0262∗∗∗ −0.0491∗∗∗ −0.0160∗∗∗ -0.0057 −0.0295∗∗∗ −0.0500∗∗∗
(-3.96) (-1.67) (-4.46) (-3.68) (-2.77) (-0.40) (-4.41) (-3.20)
3 09.05.2004 Bombing in Russia −0.0229∗∗∗ −0.0316∗∗∗ −0.0290∗∗∗ −0.0384∗∗ −0.0120∗ -0.0134 −0.0344∗∗∗ −0.0467∗∗∗
(-4.64) (-2.60) (-4.55) (-2.49) (-1.60) (-0.73) (-5.30) (-2.94)
4 07.10.2004 Bombing in Egypt −0.0069∗ −0.0309∗∗∗ -0.0032 −0.0255∗∗ −0.0104∗∗ −0.0360∗∗ −0.0124∗∗ −0.0388∗∗∗
(-1.62) (-2.85) (-0.64) (-2.06) (-1.74) (-2.44) (-2.18) (-2.59)
5 07.07.2005 Suicide Bombing −0.0050∗ 0.0140 −0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0044 0.0014 0.0252 −0.0108∗∗ 0.0175
in the UK (-1.65) (1.65) (-3.58) (0.36) (0.36) (2.22) (-2.22) (1.43)
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Table 3: A non-parametric approach: Local and global effects. The table displays the effect of five major terrorist events on stock markets. CP stands
for conditional probability and CAR stands for cumulative abnormal return. Abnormal movements in the event-day returns or in the post-event window
correspond to the conditional probability in the interval (0.05;0.10]. Extreme index movements correspond to the conditional probability in the interval
[0.00;0.05]. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
N Event Terrorist Attack FTSE All World MSCI Europe
Day Event-day CP 6-day CP Event-day CP 6-day CP
Return CAR Return CAR
1 11.09.2001 9/11 Attacks in −0.0183∗∗ 0.035 −0.0441∗∗ 0.04 −0.0635∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0540∗∗ 0.011
the US (0.013) (0.016) (0.000) (0.019)
2 11.03.2004 Bombing in Madrid −0.0170∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.0185 0.29 −0.0261∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0491∗∗ 0.03
(0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.012)
3 09.05.2004 Bombing in Russia −0.0212∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.0316 0.11 −0.0265∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0384∗ 0.08
(0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.020)
4 07.10.2004 Bombing in Egypt −0.0060∗ 0.09 −0.0309∗ 0.10 -0.0014 0.41 -0.0255 0.24
(0.020) (0.024) (0.036) (0.031)
5 07.07.2005 Suicide Bombing -0.0034 0.21 0.0140 0.82 −0.0146∗∗ 0.02 0.0044 0.62
in the UK (0.033) (0.027) (0.009) (0.036)
N Event Terrorist Attack S&P 500 SMI
Day Event-day CP 6-day CP Event-day CP 6-day CP
Return CAR Return CAR
1 11.09.2001 9/11 Attacks in −0.0505∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0668∗∗ 0.03 −0.0733∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.0536 0.14
the US (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.026)
2 11.03.2004 Bombing in Madrid −0.0153∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.0057 0.41 −0.0294∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0500∗∗ 0.03
(0.004) (0.036) (0.000) (0.012)
3 09.05.2004 Bombing in Russia −0.0106∗ 0.07 -0.0134 0.33 −0.0324∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0467∗∗ 0.04
(0.019) (0.035) (0.000) (0.013)
4 07.10.2004 Bombing in Egypt −0.0100∗ 0.06 −0.0360∗ 0.08 -0.0106 0.14 −0.0388∗ 0.09
(0.018) (0.023) (0.026) (0.020)
5 07.07.2005 Suicide Bombing 0.0024 0.68 0.0252 0.89 −0.0093∗∗ 0.03 0.0175 0.82
in the UK (0.033) (0.022) (0.012) (0.027)
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Table 4: Comparison of the event-day negative impact of terrorist attacks, financial crashes and natural catastrophes across different methodologies. The
table displays the event-day negative effect of terrorist attacks, financial crises and natural catastrophes on stock markets. For example, for FTSE All World
index the results of an event-study with respect to terrorist attacks are as follows: out of 77 events under consideration, 30 had an event-day negative impact.
For 15 events out of 30, index return movements were extreme.
Terrorist Attacks Financial Crashes
Index Event-Study Non-Parametric GARCH-EVT Event-Study Non-Parametric GARCH-EVT
Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num.
Events Events Events Events Events Events
FTSE All World 30 15 77 28 19 77 26 19 76 2 2 4 2 2 4 1 1 4
MSCI Europe 29 22 77 28 17 77 22 16 77 1 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 4
S&P 500 19 14 77 23 19 77 22 15 77 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4
SMI 27 23 77 29 22 77 28 15 77 1 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 4
FTSE Global Banks 20 13 67 21 11 66 20 10 69 2 1 3 1 1 3 0 0 2
FTSE Global Financials 23 17 67 23 19 66 21 19 66 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 1 3
MSCI Europe Insurance 29 20 75 31 18 73 28 20 73 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3
FTSE All World Life Ins. 26 20 77 27 17 76 23 11 74 2 2 4 1 1 4 2 2 4
FTSE All World Non-Life
Insurance 23 13 77 24 19 76 22 15 75 2 2 4 1 1 4 1 1 3
FTSE All World Travel 19 12 77 20 15 76 19 8 77 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4
MSCI Europe Airlines 25 20 75 21 19 73 23 21 74 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3
FTSE All World Aero/Def. 21 16 77 21 15 76 23 16 76 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4
FTSE All World Pharma/Bio 20 15 77 18 15 76 15 10 76 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4
FTSE All World Oil/Gas 13 10 77 16 12 76 13 12 62 1 1 4 1 1 4 0 0 2
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas 10 10 77 13 8 76 10 8 62 1 1 4 1 0 4 0 0 2
GSCI Commodity 8 5 77 10 7 77 7 2 77 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 4
GSCI Gold 9 7 77 8 6 77 9 7 77 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 4
J.P.Morgan GGBI 4 3 77 4 4 77 4 3 77 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 4
FTSE Eurozone Bond Index 4 3 63 4 3 62 3 2 60 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 1
FTSE US Gov. Bond Index 7 2 59 6 1 59 3 1 59 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
3
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Table 4: (cont’d.)
Natural Catastrophes
Index Event-Study Non-Parametric GARCH-EVT
Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num.
Events Events Events
FTSE All World 1 0 18 2 1 18 0 0 18
MSCI Europe 3 2 19 2 2 19 2 1 19
S&P 500 0 0 19 0 0 19 0 0 19
SMI 1 1 19 1 1 19 1 1 19
FTSE Global Banks 1 0 17 0 0 16 0 0 17
FTSE Global Financials 0 0 17 1 1 16 0 0 17
MSCI Europe Insurance 2 2 17 2 2 17 2 0 17
FTSE All World Life Insurance 1 0 18 1 0 18 0 0 17
FTSE All World Non-Life 3 1 18 3 0 18 2 0 16
FTSE All World Travel 2 1 18 0 0 18 0 0 18
MSCI Europe Airlines 1 1 17 0 2 17 2 1 17
FTSE All World Aero/Defense 0 0 18 1 1 18 1 0 18
FTSE All World Pharma/Biotech 0 0 18 0 0 18 0 0 18
FTSE All World Oil/Gas 1 0 18 0 0 18 0 0 15
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas 2 1 18 1 1 18 1 0 15
GSCI Commodity 4 4 19 3 2 19 2 2 19
GSCI Gold 0 0 19 1 0 19 0 0 19
J.P.Morgan GGBI 3 3 19 2 1 19 2 2 19
FTSE Eurozone Bond Index 2 0 15 2 1 14 1 0 14
FTSE US Government Bond Index 0 0 9 1 0 8 0 0 9
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Table 5: Comparison of the event-day positive impact of terrorist attacks, financial crashes and natural catastrophes across different methodologies. The
table displays the event-day positive effect of terrorist attacks, financial crises and natural catastrophes on stock markets. For example, for FTSE All World
Aero/Defence index the results of an event-study with respect to terrorist attacks are as follows: out of 77 events under consideration, 6 had an event-day
positive impact. For 4 out of 6 events, index return movements were extreme.
Terrorist Attacks Financial Crashes
Index Event-Study Non-Parametric GARCH-EVT Event-Study Non-Parametric GARCH-EVT
Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num.
Events Events Events Events Events Events
FTSE All World Aero/Def. 6 4 77 7 5 76 6 6 76 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 4
FTSE All World Pharma/
Biotech 6 1 77 6 5 76 9 6 76 0 0 4 1 1 4 1 1 4
FTSE All World Oil/Gas 1 0 77 7 1 76 4 1 62 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 2
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas 2 0 77 5 2 76 6 3 62 0 0 4 1 1 4 0 0 2
GSCI Commodity 7 4 77 8 7 77 10 5 77 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 4
GSCI Gold 4 2 77 6 3 77 2 2 77 2 1 4 1 1 4 2 1 4
J.P.Morgan GGBI 13 9 77 10 8 77 12 5 77 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4
FTSE Eurozone BI 14 7 63 13 7 62 12 8 60 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 1
FTSE US Gov. Bond Index 8 3 59 13 5 59 7 4 59 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
4
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Table 5: (cont’d.)
Natural Catastrophes
Index Event-Study Non-Parametric GARCH-EVT
Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num. Total Ext. Num.
Events Events Events
FTSE All World Aero/Defense 2 2 18 1 1 18 1 1 18
FTSE All World Pharma/Biotech 0 0 18 0 0 18 0 0 18
FTSE All World Oil/Gas 0 0 18 0 0 18 1 0 15
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas 0 0 18 1 0 18 2 0 15
GSCI Commodity 3 2 19 3 2 19 2 2 19
GSCI Gold 1 1 19 2 2 19 0 0 19
J.P.Morgan GGBI 3 3 19 2 1 19 1 0 19
FTSE Eurozone Bond Index 2 1 15 2 1 14 2 2 14
FTSE US Government Bond Index 0 0 9 0 0 8 0 0 9
4
1
Table 6: Positive effect on the aero/defense and pharma/biotech industries: Common terrorist events.
FTSE All World Aero/Defense FTSE All World Pharma/Biotech
N Date Attack Event Study Non-Parametric A. GARCH-EVT Event Study Non-Parametric A. GARCH-EVT
1 19.04.1995 Bombing in Oklahoma City ∨ ∨ ∨
2 08.01.1996 Kidnapping in Indonesia ∨ ∨ ∨
3 31.01.1996 Bomb Attack in Sri Lanka ∨ ∨
4 04.03.1996 Suicide Bombing in Israel ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
5 10.04.2002 Armed Assault in India ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
6 10.04.2002 Suicide Bombing in Israel ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
7 08.05.2002 Bombing in Pakistan ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
8 17.07.2002 Suicide Bombing in Israel ∨ ∨
9 04.08.2002 Bombing in Israel ∨ ∨
10 05.08.2002 Armed Assault in Pakistan ∨ ∨
11 12.10.2002 Bombing in Indonesia/Bali ∨ ∨ ∨
12 27.12.2002 Suicide Bombing in Russia ∨ ∨
13 01.02.2004 Suicide Bombing in Iraq ∨ ∨ ∨
14 15.04.2005 Armed Assault in Colombia ∨ ∨ ∨
4
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Table 7: Positive effect on the oil/gas industry: Common terrorist events.
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas FTSE World Oil/Gas
N Date Attack Event Study Non-Parametric A. GARCH-EVT Event Study Non-Parametric A. GARCH-EVT
1 17.04.1999 Bombing in the UK ∨ ∨ ∨
2 11.09.2001 9/11 Attacks in the US ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
3 08.05.2002 Bombing in Pakistan ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
4 17.07.2002 Suicide Bombing in Israel ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
5 31.07.2002 Bombing in Israel ∨ ∨ ∨
6 04.08.2002 Bombing in Israel ∨ ∨ ∨
7 05.08.2002 Armed Assault in Pakistan ∨ ∨ ∨
8 05.08.2003 Bombing in Indonesia/Bali ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
9 05.12.2003 Suicide Bombing in Russia ∨ ∨
10 09.12.2003 Suicide Bombing in Russia ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
11 18.04.2005 Armed Assault in Russia ∨ ∨
12 25.08.2005 Bombing in Russia ∨ ∨ ∨
4
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Table 8: Portfolio performance analysis of the Swiss investors. The table reports the portfolio performance measured
via Sharpe Ratio of the SMI Index and two different hedged SMI portfolios. The portfolios were constructed 1 week
before the September 11 terrorist attacks and performance is evaluated on the given dates.
11.09.2001 18.09.2001 25.09.2001 4.10.2001
First Investor -0.7161 -0.3448 -0.2360 -0.0942
Second Investor -0.5264 0.0396 0.0002 0.1830
Third Investor -0.0125 0.5982 0.3493 0.3753
Table 9: Portfolio performance analysis of the European investors. The table reports the portfolio performance mea-
sured via Sharpe Ratio of the MSCI Europe Index and two different hedged MSCI Europe Index portfolios. The
portfolios were constructed 1 week before the September 11 terrorist attacks and performance is evaluated on the
given dates.
11.09.2001 18.09.2001 25.09.2001 4.10.2001
First Investor -0.8497 -0.4266 -0.3308 -0.1234
Second Investor -0.5506 0.0395 -0.0097 0.1852
Third Investor -0.3199 0.4796 0.2749 0.3573
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Table 10: Robustness checks for the non-parametric approach: SMI index returns. The table displays the effect of ten terrorist events on robustified and
unrobustified SMI index returns. CP stands for conditional probability and CAR stands for cumulative abnormal return. Abnormal movements in event-
day returns or in the post-event window correspond to the conditional probability in the interval (0.05;0.10]. Extreme index movements correspond to the
conditional probability in the interval [0.00;0.05]. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. NA stands for ”Not Applicable” i.e. couldn’t be computed due
to data restrictions.
N Event Terrorist Attack Robustified SMI Unrobustified SMI
Day Return CP 6-day CP Return CP 6-day CP
on CAR on CAR
Aver. Aver.
1 11.09.2001 9/11 Attacks in −0.0379∗∗∗ 0.00 NA NA −0.0733∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0536 0.14
the US (0.000) (0.000) (0.026)
2 11.03.2004 Bombing in Madrid −0.0154∗∗∗ 0.00 NA NA −0.0294∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0500∗∗ 0.03
(0.000) (0.000 ) (0.012)
3 09.05.2004 Bombing in Russia −0.0184∗∗∗ 0.00 NA NA −0.0324∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0467∗∗ 0.04
(0.000) ( 0.000) (0.013)
4 07.10.2004 Bombing in Egypt −0.0073 0.1457 NA NA −0.0106 0.14 −0.0388∗ 0.09
(0.0259) (0.026) (0.020)
5 18.04.2005 Armed Assault −0.0029 0.2718 −0.0047 0.3278 −0.0157∗∗ 0.02 −0.0196 0.18
in Russia (0.0316 ) ( 0.0386 ) ( 0.009) (0.027 )
6 10.05.2005 Bombing in Russia −0.0066 0.1584 −0.0206 0.1254 −0.0143∗∗ 0.04 −0.007 0.38
( 0.0259 ) ( 0.0234 ) ( 0.014 ) (0.04 )
7 24.06.2005 Armed Assault −0.0032 0.2767 −0.0167 0.1439 −0.0081 0.1 −0.0133 0.3
in Israel (0.0321 ) (0.0253) (0.022) ( 0.033 )
8 07.07.2005 Suicide Bombing −0.0033 0.2623 0.0268 0.8992 −0.0093∗∗ 0.03 0.0175 0.82
in the UK (0.0322 ) (0.0200) (0.012) (0.027)
9 23.07.2005 Bombing in Egypt −0.0032 0.3517 0.0186 0.8369 0.0018 0.57 0.0119 0.73
(0.0444 ) (0.0271) (0.035 ) ( 0.032)
10 15.08.2005 Bombing in Russia −0.0053 0.1794 −0.0288∗∗ 0.0400 −0.0017 0.41 −0.0195 0.21
and Egypt (0.0284 ) ( 0.0136 ) (0.039 ) (0.03)
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Table 11: Robustness checks for the non-parametric approach: MSCI Europe index returns. The table displays the effect of ten terrorist events on robustified
and unrobustified MSCI Europe index returns. CP stands for conditional probability and CAR stands for cumulative abnormal return. Abnormal movements
in event-day returns or in the post-event window correspond to the conditional probability in the interval (0.05;0.10]. Extreme index movements correspond
to the conditional probability in the interval [0.00;0.05]. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. NA stands for ”Not Applicable” i.e. couldn’t be computed
due to data restrictions.
N Event Terrorist Attack Robustified MSCI Europe Unrobustified MSCI Europe
Day Return CP 6-day CP Return CP 6-day CP
on CAR on CAR
Aver. Aver.
1 11.09.2001 9/11 Attacks in −0.0253∗∗∗ 0.00 NA NA −0.0635∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0540∗∗ 0.011
the US (0.000) (0.000) (0.019)
2 11.03.2004 Bombing in Madrid −0.0074∗ 0.059 NA NA −0.0261∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0491∗∗ 0.03
(0.0193) (0.000 ) (0.012)
3 09.05.2004 Bombing in Russia −0.0114∗∗ 0.0312 NA NA −0.0265∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0384∗ 0.08
(0.0124) ( 0.000) (0.020)
4 07.10.2004 Bombing in Egypt 0.0019 0.6487 NA NA −0.0014 0.41 −0.0255 0.24
(0.0375) (0.036) (0.031)
5 18.04.2005 Armed Assault −0.0029 0.3015 0.0097 0.7269 −0.0178∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.0070 0.50
in Russia (0.0353 ) ( 0.0344 ) ( 0.013) (0.036 )
6 10.05.2005 Bombing in Russia 0.0001 0.4097 −0.0155 0.1410 −0.0060 0.12 0.0043 0.54
( 0.0356 ) ( 0.0235 ) ( 0.024 ) (0.040 )
7 24.06.2005 Armed Assault −0.0019 0.4560 −0.0035 0.4466 −0.0075∗ 0.06 −0.0055 0.46
in Israel (0.0390 ) (0.0396) (0.017) ( 0.035 )
8 07.07.2005 Suicide Bombing −0.0088∗∗ 0.0377 0.0165 0.9069 −0.0146∗∗ 0.02 0.0044 0.62
in the UK (0.0141 ) (0.0204) (0.009) (0.036)
9 23.07.2005 Bombing in Egypt −0.0040 0.2409 0.0051 0.6296 0.0026 0.59 0.0008 0.55
(0.0304 ) (0.0347) (0.035 ) ( 0.036)
10 15.08.2005 Bombing in Russia −0.0063 0.1206 −0.0221∗ 0.0930 −0.0010 0.31 −0.0057 0.44
and Egypt (0.0294 ) ( 0.0233 ) (0.033 ) (0.035)
4
6
